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We consider games of strategic substitutes and strategic complements on networks, and introduce
two different evolutionary dynamics in order to refine their multiplicity of equilibria. We analyze the
system through a mean field approach to both dynamics. We find that for the best-shot game, taken
as a representative example of strategic substitutes, a replicator-like (imitative) dynamics does not
lead to Nash equilibria, whereas, it leads to a unique equilibrium (full cooperation or full defection,
depending on the initial condition and the game parameters) for complements, represented by a
coordination game. On the other hand, when the dynamics becomes more cognitively demanding
in the form of a best response, predictions are always Nash equilibria (at least when individuals are
fully rational): For the best-shot game we find a reduced set of equilibria with a definite value of
the fraction of contributors, whereas, for the coordination game symmetric equilibria arise only for
low or high initial fractions of cooperators. We further extend our analytical study by considering
complex topologies through a heterogeneous mean field technique, and show that the nature of
the selected equilibria does not change for the best-shot game. However, for coordination games
we reveal an important difference, namely that on infinitely large scale-free networks cooperative
equilibria arise for any value of the incentive to cooperate. Our analytical results are confirmed by
numerical simulations available in the literature, and open the question of whether there can be a
dynamics that consistently leads to stringent equilibria refinements for both classes of games.
List of abbreviations used: PI (proportional imitation), BR (best response), MF (homogeneous mean
field), HMF (heterogeneous mean field)
JEL codes: C73 (stochastic and dynamic games; evolutionary games; repeated games)
Keywords: strategic interactions; evolutionary games; network equilibria; mean field theory
I. INTRODUCTION
Strategic interactions among individuals located on a network, be it geographical, social or of any other nature,
are becoming increasingly relevant in many economic contexts. Decisions made by our neighbors on the network
influence ours, and are in turn influenced by their other neighbors to whom we may or may not be connected. Such a
framework makes finding the best strategy a very complex problem, almost always plagued by a very large multiplicity
of equilibria. Researchers are devoting much effort to this problem, and an increasing body of knowledge is being
consolidated [1–3]. In this work we consider games of strategic substitutes and strategic complements on networks, as
discussed in [4]. In this paper, Galeotti et al. obtained an important reduction in the number of game equilibria by
going from a complete information setting to an incomplete one. They introduced incomplete information by assuming
that each player is only aware of the number of neighbors she has, but not of their identity nor of the number of
neighbors they have in turn. We here aim at providing an alternative equilibrium refinement by looking at network
games from a evolutionary viewpoint. In particular, we look for the set of equilibria which can be accessed according
to two different dynamics for players’ strategies, and discuss the implications of such reduction. Furthermore, we go
beyond the state of the art mean field approach and consider the role of complex topologies with an heterogeneous
mean field technique.
Our work belongs to the literature on strategic interactions in networks and its applications to economics [5–13]. In
particular, one of the games we study is a discrete version of a public goods game proposed by Bramoulle´ and Kranton
[14], who opened the way to the problem of equilibrium selection in this kind of games under complete information.
Bramoulle´ further considered this problem [15] for the case of anti-coordination games on networks, showing that
network effects are much stronger than for coordination games. As already stated, our paper originates from Galeotti
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2et al. [4], for they considered one-shot games with strategic complements and substitutes and model equilibria resulting
from incomplete information. Our approach is instead based on evolutionary selection of equilibria—pertaining to
the large body of work emanating from the Nash programme [16–19]—and is thus complementary to theirs. In
particular we focus on the analysis of two evolutionary dynamics (see Roca et al. [20] for a review of the literature)
in two representative games, and on how this dynamics leads to a refinement of the Nash equilibria or to other final
states. The dynamics we consider are Proportional Imitation [21, 22], that does not lead in general to Nash equilibria,
and Best Response [23, 24], that instead allows for convergence to Nash equilibria—an issue about which there are a
number of interesting results in the case of a well-mixed population [25–27]. As we are working on a network setup, our
specific perspective is close to that of Boncinelli and Pin [28]. They elaborate on the literature on stochastic stability
[19, 29] (see [24, 30] for an early example of related dynamics on lattices) as a device that selects the equilibria that
are more likely to be observed in the long run, in the presence of small errors occurring with a vanishing probability.
They work from the observation [31] that different equilibria can be selected depending on assumptions on the relative
likelihood of different types of errors. Thus, Boncinelli and Pin work with a Best Response dynamics and by means of
a Markov Chain analysis find, counter-intuitively, that when contributors are the most perturbed players, the selected
equilibrium is the one with the highest contribution. The techniques we use here are based on differential equations
and have a more dynamical character, and we do not incorporate the possibility of having special distributions of
errors—although we do consider random mistakes. Particularly relevant to our work is the paper by Lo´pez-Pintado
[32] (see [33] for an extension to the case of directed networks) where a mean field dynamical approach involving
a random subsample of players is proposed. Within this framework, the network is dynamic, as if at each period
the network were generated randomly. Then a unique globally stable state of the dynamics is found, although the
identities of free riders might change from one period to another. The difference with our work is that we do not deal
with a time-dependent subsample of the population, but we use a global mean field approach (possibly depending on
the connectivity of individuals) to describe the behavior of a static network.
In the remainder of this Introduction we present the games we study and the dynamics we apply for equilibrium
refinement in detail, discuss the implications of such a framework on the informational settings we are considering,
and summarize our main contributions.
A. Framework
1. Games
We consider a finite set of agents I of cardinality n, linked together in a fixed, undirected, exogenous network.
The links between agents reflect social interactions, and connected agents are said to be “neighbors”. The network
is defined through a n × n symmetric matrix G with null diagonal, where Gij = 1 means that agents i and j are
neighbors, while Gij = 0 that they are not. We indicate with Ni the set of i’s neighbors, i.e., Ni = {j ∈ I : Gij = 1},
where the number of such neighbors |Ni| = ki is the degree of the node.
Each player can take one of two actions X = {0, 1}, with xi ∈ X denoting i’s action. Hence, only pure strategies
are considered. In our context (particularly for the case of substitutes), action 1 may be interpreted as cooperating
and action 0 as not doing so—or defecting. Thus, the two actions are labeled in the rest of the paper as C and D,
respectively. There is a cost c, where 0 < c < 1, for choosing action x = 1, while action x = 0 bears no cost.
In what follows we concentrate on two games, the best-shot game and a coordination game, as representative
instances of strategic substitutes and strategic complements, respectively. We choose specific examples for the sake
of being able to study analytically their dynamics. To define the payoffs we introduce the following notation: xNi =∑
j∈Ni
xj is the aggregate action in Ni and yi = xi + xNi .
a. Strategic Substitutes: Best-shot game This game was first considered by Bramoulle´ and Kranton [14] as a
model of the local provision of a public good. As stated above, we consider the discrete version, where there are only
two actions available, as in [4, 28]. The corresponding payoff function takes the form
πi = ΘH(yi − 1)− c xi (1)
where ΘH(·) is the Heaviside step function ΘH(x) = 1 if x ≥ 0 and ΘH(x) = 0 otherwise.
b. Strategic Complements: Coordination game For our second example, we follow Galeotti et al. [4] and consider
again a discrete version of the game, but now let the payoffs of any particular agent i be given by
πi = (αxNi − c)xi. (2)
Assuming that c > α > 0, we are faced with a coordination game where, as discussed in [4], depending on the
underlying network and the information conditions, there can generally be multiple equilibria.
32. Dynamics
Within the two games we have presented above, we now consider evolutionary dynamics for players’ strategies.
Starting at t = 0 with a certain fraction ρ(0) =
∑
i xi(0)/n of players randomly chosen to undertake action x = 1,
at each round t of the game players collect their payoff π(t) according to their neighbors’ actions and the kind of
game under consideration. Subsequently, a fraction q of players update their strategy. We consider two different
mechanisms for strategy updating:
a. Proportional Imitation (PI) [21, 22]. It represents a rule of imitative nature in which player i may copy the
strategy of a selected counterpart j, which is chosen randomly among the ki neighbors of i. The probability that i
copies j’s strategy depends on the difference between the payoffs they obtained in the previous round of the game:
P {xj(t)→ xi(t+ 1)} =
{
[πj(t)− πi(t)]/Φ if πj(t) > πi(t)
ǫ otherwise
(3)
where Φ is a normalization constant that ensures P{·} ∈ [0, 1], and 0 ≤ ǫ < 1 allows for mistakes (i.e., copying
an action that yielded less payoff in the previous round). Note that because of the imitation mechanism of PI,
the configurations xi = 1 ∀i and xi = 0 ∀i are absorbing states: The system cannot escape from them and not
even mistakes can re-introduce strategies, as they always involve imitation. On the other hand, it can be shown
that PI is equivalent to the well-known replicator dynamics in the limit of an infinitely large, well-mixed population
(equivalently, on a complete graph) [34, 35]. As was first put by Schlag [22], the assumption that agents play a
random-matching game in a large population and learn the actual payoff of another randomly chosen agent, along
with a rule of action that increases their expected payoff, leads to a probability of switching to the other agent’s
strategy that is proportional to the difference in payoffs. The corresponding aggregate dynamics is like the replicator
dynamics. See also [36] for another interpretation of these dynamics in terms of learning.
b. Best Response (BR). This rule was introduced in [23, 24] and has been widely used in the economics literature.
BR describes players that are rational and choose their strategy (myopically) in order to maximize their payoff,
assuming that their neighbors will again do what they did in the last round. This means that each player i, given the
past actions of their partners xNi(t), computes the payoffs that she would obtain by choosing action 1 (cooperating)
or 0 (defecting) at time t, respectively π˜C(t) and π˜D(t). Then actions are updated as follows:
P {xi(t+ 1) = 1} =
{
1− ǫ if π˜C(t) > π˜D(t)
ǫ if π˜C(t) < π˜D(t)
; P {xi(t+ 1) = 0} =
{
ǫ if π˜C(t) > π˜D(t)
1− ǫ if π˜C(t) < π˜D(t)
(4)
and xi(t + 1) = xi(t) if π˜C(t) = π˜D(t). Here again 0 ≤ ǫ < 1 represents the probability of making a mistake, with
ǫ = 0 indicating fully rational players.
The reason to study these two dynamics is because they may lead to different results as they represent very different
evolutions of the players’ strategies. In this respect, it is important to mention that, in the case ǫ = 0, Nash equilibria
are stable by definition under BR dynamics and, vice-versa, any stationary state found by BR is necessarily a Nash
equilibrium. On the contrary, with PI this is not always true: Even in the absence of mistakes, players can change
action by copying better-performing neighbors, also if such change leads to a decreasing of their payoffs in the next
round. Another difference between the two dynamics is the amount of cognitive capability they assume for the
players: Whereas PI refers to agents with very limited rationality, that imitate a randomly chosen neighbor on the
only condition that she does better, BR requires agents with a much more developed analytic ability.
3. Analytical and informational settings
We study how the system evolves by either of these two dynamics, starting from an initial random distribution of
strategies. In particular, we are interested in the global fraction of cooperators ρ(t) =
∑
i xi(t)/n and its possible
stationary value ρs. We carry out our calculations in the framework of a homogeneous mean field (MF) approximation,
which is most appropriate to study networks with homogeneous degree distribution P (k) like Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random
graphs [37]. The basic assumption underlying this approach is that every player interacts with an “average player”
that represents the actions of her neighbors. More formally, the MF approximation consists in assuming that when
a player interacts with a neighbor of hers, the action of such a neighbor is x = 1 with probability ρ (and x = 0
otherwise), independently on the particular pair of players considered [38]. Loosely speaking, this amounts to having
a very incomplete information setting, in which all players know only how many other players they will engage with,
and is reminiscent of that used by Galeotti et al. [4] for their refinement of equilibria. However, the analogy is not
4perfect and therefore, for the sake of accuracy, we do not dwell any further on the matter. In any case, MF represents
our setup for most of the paper.
As an extension of the results obtained in the above context, we also study the case of highly heterogeneous
networks, i.e,, networks with broad degree distribution P (k), such as scale-free ones [39]. In these cases in fact
there are a number of players with many neighbors (“hubs”) and many players with only a few neighbors, and this
heterogeneity may give rise to very different behaviors as compared to Erdo¨s-Re´nyi systems. Analytically, this can be
done by means of the heterogeneous mean field technique (HMF) [40] which generalizes, for the case of networks with
arbitrary degree distribution, the equations describing the dynamical process by considering degree-block variables
grouping nodes within the same degree. More formally, now when a player interacts with a neighbor of hers, the
action of such a neighbor is x = 1 with probability ρk (and x = 0 otherwise) if k is the neighbor’s degree (ρk is the
density of cooperators within players of degree k). By resorting to this second perspective we are able to gain insights
on the effects of heterogeneity on the evolutionary dynamics of our games.
B. Our contribution
Within this framework, our main contribution can be summarized as follows. In our basic setup of homogeneous
networks (described by the mean field approximation): For the best-shot game, PI leads to a stationary state in which
all players play xi = 0, i.e., to full defection, which is however non-Nash as any player surrounded by defectors would
obtain higher payoff by choosing cooperation (at odds with the standard version of the public goods game). This is
the result also in the presence of mistakes, unless the probability of errors becomes large, in which case the stationary
state is the opposite, xi = 1, i.e., full cooperation, also non-Nash. Hence, PI does not lead to any refinement of
the Nash equilibrium structure. On the contrary, BR leads to Nash equilibria characterized by a finite fraction of
cooperators ρs, whereas, in the case when players are affected by errors, this fraction coincides with the probability
of making an error as the mean degree of the network goes to infinity. The picture is different for the coordination
game. In this case, PI does lead to Nash equilibria, selecting the coordination in 0 below a threshold value of α and
the opposite state otherwise. This threshold is found to depend on the initial fraction ρ(0) of players choosing x = 1.
Mistakes lead to the appearance of a new possibility, an intermediate value of the fraction of players choosing 1, and
as before the initial value of this fraction governs which equilibrium is selected. BR gives similar results, albeit for
the fact that a finite fraction of 1 actions can also be found even without mistakes, and with mistakes the equilibria
are not full 0 or 1 but there is always a fraction of mistaken players. Finally, changing the analytical setting by
proceeding to the heterogeneous mean field approach does not lead to any dramatic change in the structure of the
equilibria for the best-shot game. Interestingly, things change significantly for coordination games—when played on
infinitely large scale-free networks. In this case, which is the one where the heterogeneous mean field should make a
difference, equilibria with non-vanishing cooperation obtain for any value of the incentive to cooperate (represented
by the parameter α).
The paper is organized in seven sections including this introduction. Section II presents our analysis and results for
the best-shot game. Section III deals with the coordination game. In both cases, the analytical framework is that of
the mean field technique. After an overall analysis of global welfare performed in Section IV, Section V presents the
extensions of the results for both games within the heterogeneous mean field approach, including some background on
the formalism itself. Finally, Section VI contains an assessment of the validity of all these analytical findings in light
of the results of recent numerical simulations of the system described above, and Section VII concludes summarizing
our most important findings concerning the refinement of equilibria in network games and pointing to relevant open
questions.
II. BEST-SHOT GAME
A. Proportional imitation
We begin by considering the case of strategic substitutes when imitation of a neighbor is only possible if she has
obtained better payoff than the focal player, i.e., ǫ = 0 in eq. (3). In that case, the main result is the following:
Proposition 1. Within the mean field formalism, under PI dynamics, when ǫ = 0 the final state for the population
is the absorbing state with a density of cooperators ρ = 0 (full defection) except if the initial state is full cooperation.
Proof. Working in a mean field context means that individuals are well-mixed, i.e., every player interacts with
average players. In this case the differential equation for the density of cooperators ρ is
ρ˙/q = (1 − ρ)ρPD→C − ρ(1− ρ)PC→D. (5)
5The first term is the probability (1 − ρ)ρ of picking a defector with a neighboring cooperator, times the probability
of imitation PD→C . The second term is the probability ρ(1− ρ) of picking a cooperator with a neighboring defector,
times the probability of imitation PC→D. In the best-shot game a defector cannot copy a neighboring cooperator (who
has lower payoff by construction), whereas, a cooperator eventually copies one of her neighboring defectors (who has
higher payoff). Hence PD→C = 0 and PC→D is equal to the payoff difference 1− (1− c) = c. Since the normalization
constant Φ = 1 for strategic substitutes, eq. (5) becomes
ρ˙/q = −cρ(1− ρ) (6)
The solution, for any initial condition 0 < ρ(0) < 1, is
ρ(t) = {1 + [ρ(0)−1 − 1]ecqt}−1, (7)
hence ρ(t)→ 0 for t→∞: The only stationary state is full defection unless ρ(0) = 1. 
Remark 1: As discussed above, PI does not necessarily lead to Nash equilibria as asymptotic, stationary states.
This is clear in this case. For any ρ(0) < 1 the population ends up in full defection, even if every individual player
would be better off by switching to cooperation. This phenomenon is likely to arise from the substitutes or anti-
coordination character of the game: In a context in which it is best to do the opposite of the other players, imitation
does not seem the best way for players to decide on their actions.
Proposition 2. Within the mean field formalism, under PI dynamics, when ǫ ∈ (0, 1) the final state for the
population is the absorbing state ρ = 0 (full defection) when ǫ < c, ρ = ρ(0) when ǫ = c, and ρ = 1 when ǫ > c.
When the initial state is ρ(0) = 0 or ρ(0) = 1, it remains unchanged.
Proof. Eq. (5) is still valid, with PC→D unchanged, whereas, PD→C = ǫ. By introducing the effective cost c˜ = c− ǫ
we can rewrite eq. (7) as:
ρ(t) = {1 + [ρ(0)−1 − 1]ec˜qt}−1 (8)
Hence ρ(t)→ 0 for t→ ∞ only for c˜ > 0 (ǫ < c); Instead for c˜ = 0 (ǫ = c) then ρ(t) ≡ ρ(0) ∀t, and for c˜ < 0 (ǫ > c)
then ρ(t)→ 1 for t→∞ (cooperation is favored now). 
Remark 2: As before, PI does not drive the population to a Nash equilibrium, independently of the probability of
making a mistake. However, mistakes do introduce a bias towards cooperation and thus a new scenario: When their
probability exceeds the cost of cooperating, the whole population ends up cooperating.
B. Best response
We now turn to the case of the best response dynamics, which (at least for ǫ = 0) is guaranteed to drive the system
towards Nash equilibria. In this scenario, we have not been able to find a rigorous proof of our main result, but we
can make some approximations in the equation that support it. As we will see, our main conclusion is that, within
the mean field formalism under BR dynamics, when ǫ = 0 the final state for the population is a mixed state ρ = ρs,
0 < ρs < 1, for any initial condition.
Indeed, for BR dynamics without mistakes, the homogeneous mean field equation for ρ˙ is
ρ˙/q = −ρQ[πC < πD] + (1− ρ)Q[πC > πD] (9)
where the first term is the probability of picking a cooperator who would do better by defecting, and the second term
is the probability of picking a defector who would do better by cooperating. This far, no approximation has been
made; However, these two probabilities cannot be exactly computed and we need to estimate them.
To evaluate the two probabilities, we can recall that πC = 1−c always, whereas, πD = 0 when none of the neighbors
cooperates and πD = 1 otherwise. Therefore, for an average player of degree k we have that Qk[πC > πD] = (1− ρ)
k.
Consistently with the mean field framework we are working on, as a rough approximation we can assume that every
player has degree k¯ (the average degree of the network), so that Q[πC > πD] = 1−Q[πC < πD] = (1− ρ)
k¯. Thus, we
have
ρ˙/q = (1 − ρ)k¯ − ρ. (10)
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FIG. 1. Best-shot game under BR dynamics in the mean field framework. Shown are the asymptotic cooperation values ρs vs
the average degree k¯ for different values of the probability of making a mistake ǫ. Values are obtained by numerically solving
eq. (13).
To go beyond this simple estimation, we can work out a better approximation by integrating Qk[πC > πD] over the
probability distribution of players’ degrees P (k). For Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random graphs, in the limit of large populations
(n→∞), it is P (k) ≃ k¯ke−k¯/k!. This leads to Q[πC > πD] = e
−k¯ρ and, subsequently,
ρ˙/q = e−k¯ρ − ρ. (11)
Remark 3. The precise asymptotic value for the density of cooperators, ρs, depends on the approximation
considered above. However, at least for networks that are not too inhomogeneous, the approximations turn out to
be very good, and therefore the corresponding picture for the evolution of the population is quite accurate. It is
interesting to note that, whatever its exact value, in both cases ρs is such that the right-hand sides of eq. (10) and
eq. (11) vanishes and, furthermore, ρs is an attractor of the dynamics, because d(ρ˙)/dρ|ρs < 0.
How is the above result modified by mistakes? When ǫ ∈ (0, 1), eq. (9) becomes:
ρ˙/q = Q[πC < πD]{−ρ(1− ǫ) + (1− ρ)ǫ}+Q[πC > πD]{(1− ρ)(1− ǫ)− ρǫ}
= Q[πC < πD](−ρ+ ǫ) +Q[πC > πD](1− ρ− ǫ) (12)
where the first term accounts for cooperators rightfully switching to defection and defectors wrongly selecting co-
operation, while the second term accounts for defectors correctly choosing cooperation and cooperators mistaken to
defection. Proceeding as before, and again in the limit n→∞, we approximate Q[πC > πD] = e
−k¯ρ, thus arriving at
ρ˙/q = (1 − 2ǫ)e−k¯ρ − (ρ− ǫ) (13)
from which it is possible to find the attractor of the dynamics ρs. Such attractor in turn exists if
ǫ < (1 + k¯−1ek¯ρs)/2,
a threshold that is bounded below by 1/2, which would be tantamount to players choosing their action at random.
Therefore, all reasonable values for the probability of errors allow for equilibria.
Remark 4. To gain some insight on the cooperation levels arising from BR dynamics in the Nash equilibria, we
have numerically solved eq. (13). The values for ρs are plotted in Fig. 1 for different values of ǫ, as a function of
k¯. We observe that the larger k¯, the lower the cooperation level. The intuition behind such result is that the more
connections every player has, the lower the need to play 1 to ensure obtaining a positive payoff. It could then be
thought that this conclusion is reminiscent of the equilibria found for best-shot games in [4], which are non increasing
in the degree. However, this is not the case, as in our work we are considering an iterated game that can perfectly
7lead to high degree nodes having to cooperate. Note also that this approach leads to a definite value for the density
of cooperators in the Nash equilibrium, but there can be many action profiles for the player compatible with that
value, so multiplicity of equilibria is reduced but not suppressed.
Remark 5. From Fig. 1 it is also apparent that as the likelihood of mistakes increases, the density of cooperators
at equilibrium increases. Note that for very large values of the connectivity k¯, eq. (13) has solution ρ(t) = ρ(0)e−qt+ǫ,
and thus ρs ≡ ǫ, in agreement with the fact that when a player has many neighbors she can assume that a fraction ǫ
of them will cooperate, thus turning defection into her BR.
III. COORDINATION GAME
We now turn to the case of strategic complements, exemplified by our coordination game. As above, we start from
the case without mistakes, and we subsequently see how they affect the results.
A. Proportional imitation
Proposition 3. Within the mean field formalism, under PI dynamics, when ǫ = 0 the final state for the population
is the absorbing state with a density of cooperators ρ = 0 (full defection) when α < αc ≡ c/[k¯ρ(0)], and the absorbing
state with ρ = 1 when α > αc. In the case α = αc both outcomes are possible.
Proof. Still within our homogeneous mean field context, the differential equation for the density of cooperators
ρ is again eq. (5). As we are in the case in which ǫ = 0, we have that PD→C = (πC − πD)Q[πC > πD]/Φ and
PC→D = (πD − πC)Q[πC < πD]/Φ = −(πC − πD)(1 −Q[πC > πD])/Φ, where for strategic complements Φ = αkmax.
Given that πD = 0 and that, consistently with our MF framework, πC = αk¯ρ− c, we find:
ρ˙/q = ρ(1 − ρ)(αk¯ρ− c)/Φ = cρ(1− ρ)(ρ/ρc − 1)/Φ, (14)
where we have introduced the values ρc = ρ(0)[αc/α] and αc ≡ c/[k¯ρ(0)].
It is easy to see that ρ = ρc is an unstable equilibrium, as ρ˙ < 0 for ρ < ρc and ρ˙ > 0 for ρ > ρc. Therefore, we
have two different cases: When α > αc then ρc < ρ(0) and the final state is full cooperation (ρ = 1), whereas, when
α < αc then ρc > ρ(0) and the outcome is full defection (ρ = 0). When α ≡ αc then ρc ≡ ρ(0), so both outcomes are
in principle possible. 
Remark 6. The same (but opposite) intuition we discussed in Remark 1 about the outcome of PI on substitute
games suggests that imitation is indeed a good procedure to choose actions in a coordination setup. In fact, contrary
to the case of the best-shot game, in the coordination game PI does lead to Nash equilibria, and indeed it makes a
very precise prediction: A unique equilibrium that depends on the initial density. Turning around the condition for
the separatrix, we have ρ(0) < c/(k¯α), i.e., when few people cooperate initially then evolution leads to everybody
defecting, and vice versa. In any event, having a unique equilibrium (except exactly at the separatrix) is a remarkable
achievement.
Remark 7. In a system where players may have different degrees, while full defection is always a Nash equilibrium
for the coordination game, full cooperation becomes a Nash equilibrium only when α > c/kmin, where kmin is the
smallest degree in the network—which means that only networks with kmin > c/α > 1 feature a fully cooperative
Nash equilibrium.
When ǫ ∈ (0, 1), the problem becomes much more involved and we have not been able to prove rigorously our main
result. In fact, now we have PD→C = (πC − πD)Q[πC > πD]/Φ + ǫQ[πC < πD] and PC→D = (πD − πC)Q[πC <
πD]/Φ+ ǫQ[πC > πD]. Eq. (14) thus becomes
ρ˙/q = ρ(1− ρ){c(ρ/ρc − 1)/Φ+ ǫ(1− 2Q[ρ > ρc])} (15)
where we have used Q[πC > 0] ≃ Q[αk¯ρ > c] = Q[ρ > ρc]. We then have three different cases which we can treat
approximately:
• When ρ ≃ ρc then Q[ρ > ρc] ≃ 1/2 and eq. (15) reduces to eq. (14), i.e., we would recover the result for the
case with no mistakes.
8• When ρ≫ ρc then Q[ρ > ρc] ≃ 1 and eq. (15) can be rewritten as:
ρ˙/q = ρ(1− ρ)(c/Φ + ǫ)(ρ/ρ+ − 1) (16)
with ρ+ = ρc(1 + Φǫ/c) > ρs. This value ρ+ leads to an unstable equilibrium; In particular, ρ˙ < 0 for ρ < ρ+
so that ρ→ ρc and hence eq. (15) holds.
• Finally when ρ≪ ρc then Q[ρ > ρc] ≃ 0 and eq. (15) can be rewritten as:
ρ˙/q = ρ(1− ρ)(c/Φ− ǫ)(ρ/ρ− − 1) (17)
with ρ− = ρc(1 − Φǫ/c) < ρs. As before, ρ− gives an unstable equilibrium, because ρ˙ < 0 for ρ > ρ− so that
again ρ→ ρc where eq. (15) holds.
Remark 8: In summary, the region ρ− < ρ < ρ+ becomes a finite basin of attraction for the dynamics. Note that
when ǫ > c/(αckmax) then ρ+ = ρ(0) has no solution and ρc becomes the attractor in the whole α space. Our analysis
thus shows that, for a range of initial densities of cooperators, there is a dynamical equilibrium characterized by an
intermediate value of ρ, which is neither full defection nor full cooperation. Instead, for small enough or large enough
values of ρ(0) the system evolves towards the fully defective or fully cooperative Nash equilibrium, respectively.
Remark 9: The intuition behind the result above could be that mistakes can take a number of people away from
the equilibrium, be it full defection or full cooperation, and that this takes place in a range of initial conditions that
grows with the likelihood of mistakes.
B. Best response
Considering now the case of BR dynamics, the case of the coordination game is no different from that of the best-
shot game and we cannot find rigorous proofs for our results, although we believe that we can substantiate them on
firm grounds. To proceed, for this case eq. (9) becomes:
ρ˙/q = −ρ+Q[πC > 0] (18)
where we have taken into account that πD = 0 and Q[πC < πD] = 1 −Q[πC > πD]. Assuming that every node has
degree k¯, i.e., a regular random network, it is clear that there must be at least [c/α] + 1 neighboring cooperators in
order to have πC > πD. Thus
Q[πC > πD] = Q[πC > 0] =
k¯∑
l=[c/α]+1
(
k¯
l
)
ρl(1− ρ)k¯−l (19)
and
ρ˙/q = −ρ+
k¯∑
l=[c/α]+1
(
k¯
l
)
ρl(1 − ρ)k¯−l (20)
Once again, the difficulty is to show that ρc = ρ(0)(αc/α) is the unstable equilibrium. However, we can follow the
same approach used with PI and write Q[πC > 0] ≃ Q[αk¯ρ > c] = Q[ρ > ρc], i.e., we approximate Q[πC > 0] as a
Heaviside step function with threshold in ρc. We then again have three different cases as follows:
• If ρ ≃ ρc then Q[ρ > ρc] ≃ 1/2: We have ρ˙/q = −ρ+ 1/2 and the attractor becomes ρ ≡ 1/2.
• If ρ≫ ρc then Q[ρ > ρc] ≃ 1: We have ρ˙/q = −ρ+ 1 and a stable equilibrium at ρ ≡ 1.
• Finally if ρ≪ ρc then Q[ρ > ρc] ≃ 0: We have ρ˙/q = −ρ and a stable equilibrium at ρ ≡ 0.
Remark 10: As we may see, for BR even without mistakes equilibria with intermediate values of the density of
cooperators obtain in a range of initial densities. Compared to the situation with PI, in which we only found the
absorbing states as equilibria, this points to the fact that more rational players would eventually converge to equilibria
with higher payoffs. It is interesting to note that such equilibria could be related to those found by Galeotti et al. [4]
9in the sense that not everybody in the network chooses the same action; However, we cannot make a more specific
connection as we cannot detect which players choose which action—see, however, section VB2 below.
A similar approach allows some insight on the situation ǫ > 0. We start again from eq. (12), which now reduces to:
ρ˙/q = −(ρ− ǫ) +Q[πC > 0](1− 2ǫ) (21)
Approximating as before Q[πC > 0] ≃ Q[ρ > ρc] we again have the same three different cases.
• If ρ ≃ ρc then the attractor ρ ≡ 1/2 is unaffected by the particular value of ǫ.
• If ρ≫ ρc then the stable equilibrium lies at ρ ≡ 1− ǫ;
• If ρ≪ ρc then the stable equilibrium is at ρ ≡ ǫ;
Remark 11: Adding mistakes to BR does not change dramatically the results, as it did occur with PI. The
only relevant change is that equilibria for low or high densities of cooperators are never homogeneous, as there is a
percentage of the population that chooses the wrong action. Other than that, in this case the situation is basically
the same with a range of densities converging to an intermediate amount of cooperators.
IV. ANALYSIS OF GLOBAL WELFARE
Having found the equilibria selected by different evolutionary dynamics, it is interesting to inspect their correspond-
ing welfares (measured in term of average payoffs). We can again resort to the mean field approximation to approach
this problem.
Best-shot game. In this case the payoff of player i is given by eq. (1): πi = ΘH(yi − 1)− c xi. Within the mean
field approximation, for a generic player i with degree ki we can approximate the theta function as ΘH(yi − 1) ≃
ρ+ (1− ρ)[1− (1− ρ)ki ], where the first term is the contribution given by player i cooperating (xi = 1), whereas, the
second term is the contribution of player i defecting (xi = 0) and at least one of i’s neighbors cooperating (xj = 1 for
at least one j ∈ Ni). It follows easily that:
〈π〉 =
∑
k
P (k) {ρ+ (1− ρ)[1− (1− ρ)k]− cρ}. (22)
If P (k) = δ(k − k¯) (where δ(·) stands for the Dirac delta function) then 〈π〉 = 1 − cρ − (1 − ρ)k¯+1, whereas, if
P (k) = k¯k e−k¯/k! then 〈π〉 = 1 − cρ − (1 − ρ)e−ρk¯. We recall that in the simple case where players do not make
mistakes (ǫ = 0), PI leads to a stationary cooperation level ρ ≡ 0, which corresponds to 〈π〉 = 0. On the other hand,
with BR the stationary value of ρs is given by eqn. (10) or (11), both leading to 〈πs〉 = 1 − cρs − ρs(1 − ρs). As
long as ρs < c, it is 〈πs〉 > 1− c (the payoff of full cooperation). We thus see that under BR players are indeed able
to self-organize into states with high values of welfare in a non-trivial manner: defectors are not too many and are
placed on the network such to allow any of them to be connected to at least one cooperator (and thus to get the
payoff π = 1); this, together with cooperators having π = 1 − c by construction, results in a state of higher welfare
than full cooperation.
Coordination game. Now player i’s payoff is given by eq. (2): πi = (αxNi − c)xi. Again within the mean field
framework we approximate the term xNi as ρki, and we immediately obtain:
〈π〉 =
∑
k
P (k) ρ{αρk − c} = ρ(αρk¯ − c). (23)
〈π〉 is thus a convex function of ρ, which (considering that 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1) attains its maximum value at ρ = 0 when
α < αpi := c/k¯, and at ρ = 1 for α > αpi. Recalling that, in the simple case ǫ = 0, both with PI and BR there are
two different stationary regimes (ρ → 0 for α ≪ αc = c/[ρ(0)k¯] and ρ → 1 for α ≫ αc), we immediately see that for
α > αc > αpi the stationary state ρ = 1 maximizes welfare, and the same happens for α < αpi with ρ = 0. However,
in the intermediate region αpi < α < αc the stationary state is ρ = 0 but payoffs are not optimal.
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V. EXTENSION: HIGHER HETEROGENEITY OF THE NETWORK
In the two previous sections we have confined ourselves to the case in which the only information about the network
we use is the mean degree, i.e., how many neighbors players do interact with on average. However, in many cases
we may consider information on details of the network, such as the degree distribution, and this is relevant as most
networks of a given nature (e.g., social) are usually more complex and heterogeneous than Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random graphs.
The heterogeneous mean field (HMF) [40] technique is a very common theoretical tool [41] to deal with the intrinsic
heterogeneity of networks. It is the natural generalization of the usual mean field (homogeneous mixing) approach
to networks characterized by a broad distribution of the connectivity. The fundamental assumption underlying HMF
is that the dynamical state of a vertex depends only on its degree k. In other words, all vertices having the same
number of connections have exactly the same dynamical properties. HMF theory can be interpreted also as assuming
that the dynamical process takes place on an annealed network [41], i.e., a network where connections are completely
reshuffled at each time step, with the sole constraints that both the degree distribution P (k) and the conditional
probability P (k|k′) (i.e., the probability that a node of degree k′ has a neighbor of degree k, thus encoding topological
correlations) remain constant.
Note that in the following HMF calculations we always assume that our network is uncorrelated, i.e., P (k′|k) =
k′P (k′)/k¯. This is consistent with our minimal informational setting, meaning that it represents the most natural
assumption we can make.
A. Best-shot game
1. Proportional imitation
In this framework, considering more complex network topologies does not change the results we found before, and
we again find a final state that is not a Nash equilibrium, namely full defection.
Proposition 4. In the HMF setting, under PI dynamics, when ǫ = 0 the final state for the population is the
absorbing state with a density of cooperators ρ = 0 (full defection) except if the initial state is full cooperation.
Proof. The HMF technique proceeds by building the k-block variables: We denote by ρk the density of cooperators
among players of degree k. The differential equation for the density of cooperators ρk is:
ρ˙k/q = (1− ρk)
∑
k′
ρk′P (k
′|k)Pk k
′
D→C − ρk
∑
k′
(1− ρk′)P (k
′|k)Pk k
′
C→D (24)
The first term is the probability of picking a defector of degree k with a neighboring cooperator of degree k′ times the
probability of imitation (all summed over k′), whereas, the second term is the probability of picking a cooperator of
degree k with a neighboring defector of degree k′ times the probability of imitation (again, all summed over k′). For
the best shot game, when ǫ = 0, we have:
Pk k
′
C→D = c P
k k′
D→C = 0 ∀k, k
′
We now introduce these values in eq. (24) and, using the uncorrelated network assumption, we arrive at:
ρ˙k/q = −cρk
∑
k′
(1− ρk′)
k′P (k′)
k¯
= −c(1−Θ)ρk (25)
where we have introduced the probability to find a cooperator following a randomly chosen link:
Θ :=
∑
k′
k′P (k′)ρk′/k¯. (26)
The corresponding differential equation for Θ reads
Θ˙ =
∑
k
kP (k)ρ˙k/k¯ = −qcΘ(1−Θ), (27)
and its solution has the same form of eq. (7):
Θ(t) = {1 + [Θ(0)−1 − 1]ecqt}−1 (28)
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with Θ(0) ≡ ρ(0) as ρk(0) = ρ(0) ∀k. Hence Θ(t)→ 0 for t→∞ which implies ρk(t)→ 0 for t→∞ and ∀k. 
Remark 12: For the best-shot game with PI, the particular form of the degree distribution does not change
anything. The outcome of evolution still is full defection, thus indicating that the failure to find a Nash equilibrium
arises from the (bounded rational) dynamics and not from the underlying population structure. Again, this suggests
that imitation is not a good procedure for the players to decide in this kind of games.
Proposition 5. In the HMF setting, under PI dynamics, when ǫ ∈ (0, 1) the final state for the population is the
absorbing state ρ = 0 (full defection) when ǫ < c, ρ = ρ(0) when ǫ = c, and ρ = 1 when ǫ > c. When the initial state
is ρ(0) = 0 or ρ(0) = 1, it remains unchanged.
Proof. Eq. (24) is still valid, but now Pk k
′
C→D = c and P
k k′
D→C = ǫ ∀k, k
′. Again, using the uncorrelated network
assumption, and introducing the effective cost c˜ = c− ǫ we arrive at:
ρ˙k/q = −c(1−Θ)ρk + ǫΘ(1− ρk), (29)
Θ˙ = −qc˜Θ(1−Θ), (30)
and at the end to a solution of the same form of eq. (28):
Θ(t) = {1 + [Θ(0)−1 − 1]ec˜qt}−1 (31)
with Θ(0) ≡ ρ(0). Hence Θ(t) → 0 for t → ∞ (which implies ρk(t) → 0) only for c˜ > 0 (ǫ < c); Instead for c˜ = 0
(ǫ = c) then Θ(t) ≡ Θ(0) (ρ(t) ≡ ρ(0)) ∀t, and for c˜ < 0 (ǫ > c) then Θ(t)→ 1 for t→∞ (which implies ρk(t)→ 1).

2. Best response
Always within the deterministic scenario with ǫ = 0, for the case of best response dynamics the differential equation
for each of the k-block variables ρk has the same form as eq. (9) above, where now to evaluate Qk[πC > πD] we have
to consider the particular values of neighbors’ degrees. As before, we consider the uncorrelated network case and
introduce the variable Θ from eq. (26). We thus have
Qk[πC > πD] =
[∑
k′
(1− ρ′k)P (k
′|k)
]k
= (1−Θ)k, (32)
and
ρ˙k/q = −ρkQk[πC < πD] + (1 − ρk)Qk[πC > πD] = (1−Θ)
k − ρk. (33)
The differential equation for Θ is thus:
Θ˙/q = −Θ+
∑
k
(1−Θ)kkP (k)/k¯ (34)
whose solution depends on the form of degree distribution P (k). Nevertheless, the critical value Θs such that the
right-hand side of eq. (34) equals zero is also in this case the attractor of the dynamics.
Remark 13: In order to assess the effect of degree heterogeneity, we have plotted in Fig. 2 the numerical solution
for two random graphs, an Erdo¨s-Re´nyi graph with a homogeneous degree distribution, and a scale-free graph with
a much more heterogeneous distribution P (k) = (γ − 1)k
(γ−1)
min /k
γ . In both cases, the networks are uncorrelated so
our framework applies. As we can see from the plot, the results are not very different, and they become more similar
as the average degree increases. This is related on one hand to the particular form of Nash equilibria for strategic
substitutes, where cooperators are generally the nodes with low degree, and on the other hand to the fact that the
main difference between a homogeneous and a scale-free P (k) lies in the tail of the distribution. In this sense, the
nodes with the highest degrees (that can make a difference) do not contribute to Θs and thus their effects on the
system is negligible.
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FIG. 2. Asymptotic value of the cooperator density for the best-shot game with BR dynamics for Erdo¨s-Re´nyi and scale-free
random graphs (with kmin = 3 and varying γ): Θs (main panel) and ρs (inset) vs the average degree k¯, obtained by numerically
solving eq. (34)
If we allow for the possibility of mistakes, the starting point of the analysis is—for each of the k-block variables
ρk—the differential equation given by eq. (9). Recalling that Qk[πC > πD] = (1−Θ)
k, we easily arrive at:
ρ˙k/q = ǫ− ρk + (1 − 2ǫ)(1−Θ)
k (35)
Θ˙/q = ǫ −Θ+ (1− 2ǫ)
∑
k
(1−Θ)kkP (k)/k¯. (36)
A sufficient condition for the existence of a dynamical attractor Θs is ǫ < 1/2: also in heterogeneous networks, all
reasonable values for the probability of errors allow for the existence of stable equilibria.
B. Coordination game
Unfortunately, for the coordination game, working in the HMF framework is much more complicated, and we have
been able to gain only qualitative but important insights on the system’s features. For the sake of clarity, we illustrate
only the deterministic case in which no mistakes are made (ǫ = 0).
1. Proportional imitation
The average payoffs of cooperating and defecting for players with degree k are:
πkD = 0 ∀k ; π
k
C = αk
[∑
k′
P (k′|k)ρk′
]
− c = αkΘ − c
where Θ is the same as defined in eq. (26).
We then use our starting point for the HMF formalism, eq. (24), where now the probabilities of imitation are:
Pk k
′
D→C = (π
k′
C − π
k
D)Q[π
k′
C > π
k
D]/Φ = (αk
′Θ− c)Qk′ [πC > 0]/Φ
Pk k
′
C→D = (π
k′
D − π
k
C)Q[π
k′
D > π
k
C ]/Φ = −(αkΘ− c) {1−Qk[πC > 0]} /Φ
Once again within the assumption of an uncorrelated network, we find:
Φρ˙k/q = (1− ρk)
∑
k′
ρk′
k′P (k′)
k¯
(αk′Θ− c)Qk′ [πC > 0] + ρk
∑
k′
(1− ρk′ )
k′P (k′)
k¯
(αkΘ− c) {1−Qk(πC > 0)} (37)
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In the second term we can carry out the sum over k′, which yields
∑
k′(1− ρk′)k
′P (k′)/k¯ = 1−Θ. We are now ready
to write the differential equation for Θ:
Φk¯Θ˙/q =
∑
k
kP (k)ρ˙k/q =
∑
k
kP (k)(1− ρk)
∑
k′
ρk′
k′P (k′)
k¯
(αk′Θ− c)Qk′ [πC > 0]
+
∑
k
kP (k)ρk(1−Θ)(αkΘ − c) {1−Qk[πC > 0]} . (38)
Carrying out the summation over k in the first term (which results again in 1−Θ), and relabeling k′ as k we are left
with
Φk¯Θ˙/q =
∑
k
kP (k)ρk(1−Θ)(αkΘ − c)Qk[πC > 0] +
∑
k
kP (k)ρk(1−Θ)(αkΘ − c) {1−Qk[πC > 0]}
=
∑
k
kP (k)ρk(1−Θ)(αkΘ − c) = (1−Θ)Θ
[
α
∑
k
k2P (k)ρk − ck¯
]
. (39)
Finally, introducing the new variable
Θ2 :=
∑
k′
(k′)2P (k′)ρk′/k¯ (40)
we arrive at:
ΦΘ˙/q = (1 −Θ)Θ(αΘ2 − c) (41)
Remark 14: While is it difficult to solve eq. (41) in a self-consistent way, qualitative insights can be gained by
defining αc(t) = c/Θ2(t), and by rewriting eq. (41) as Θ˙(t) ≃ α/αc(t) − 1 (the term (1 − Θ)Θ ≥ 0 always and thus
can be discarded). Now, starting from the beginning of the game at t = 0, the initial conditions {ρk(0)} univocally
determine the value of Θ2(0) and thus of αc(0). For α < αc(0), Θ˙(0) < 0 and ρ decreases. Because of this, in the next
time step t = 1 we have on average that Θ2(1) < Θ2(0), meaning αc(1) > αc(0) > α: Θ˙(1) < 0 again and ρ keeps
decreasing. By iterating such a reasoning, we conclude that in this case the stable equilibrium is Θ = 0. Symmetrically,
for α > αc(0) the attractor becomes Θ = 1, and the transition between the two regimes lies at α ≡ αc(0). Note that
Θ2 is basically the second momentum of the degree distribution, where each degree k is weighted with the density ρk.
Recalling that k¯2 may diverge for highly heterogeneous networks (for instance, it diverges for scale-free networks with
γ < 3), and that for the coordination game cooperation is more favorable for players with many neighbors (hence
ρk ≃ 1 for high k), we immediately see that in these cases Θ2 diverges as well (as the divergence is given by nodes
with high degree). Thus, while at the transition point the product αcΘ2 remains finite (and equal to c), αc → 0 to
compensate for the divergence of Θ2 (Figure 3). We can conclude that, in networks with broad P (k) and in the limit
n → ∞, cooperation emerges also when the incentive to cooperate (α) vanishes. This is likely to be related to the
fact that as the system size goes to infinity, so does the number of neighbors of the largest degree nodes. This drives
hubs to cooperate, thus triggering a non-zero level of global cooperation. However, if the network is homogeneous,
neither k¯2 nor Θ2 diverge, so that αc remains finite and the fully defective state appears also in the limit n→∞.
2. Best response
For BR dynamics, we would have to begin again from the fact that the differential equation for each of the k-block
variables ρk has the same form of eq. (18). We would then need to evaluateQk[πC > 0] =
∑k
l=[c/α]+1
(
k
l
)
[
∑
k′ ρk′P (k
′|k)]l[1−∑
k′ ρk′P (k
′|k)]k−l =
∑k
l=[c/α]+1
(
k
l
)
Θl(1−Θ)k−l. As in the homogeneous case, such expression is difficult to treat an-
alytically. Alternatively, we can perform the approximation of setting Qk[πC > 0] = Q[αkΘ > c], i.e., we approximate
Qk[πC > 0] with a Heaviside step function with threshold in Θ = c/(αk). This leads to:
ρ˙k/q = −ρk for k < c/(αΘ) (42)
ρ˙k/q = −ρk + 1 for k > c/(αΘ) (43)
Θ˙/q = −Θ+
∑
k>c/(αΘ)
kP (k)/k¯ (44)
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FIG. 3. Coordination game with PI dynamics for scale-free networks (with γ = 2.5, kmin = 3 and kmax =
√
n): Stationary
cooperation levels ρ∞ vs αΘ2 for various system sizes n. The vertical solid line identifies the critical value of αcΘ2 = c.
and to the following self-consistent equation for the equilibrium Θs:
Θs =
∑
k>c/(αΘs)
kP (k)/k¯ (45)
whose solution strongly depends on the form of degree distribution P (k). Indeed, if the network is highly heterogeneous
(e.g., a scale-free network with 2 < γ < 3), it can be shown that Θs is a stable equilibrium whose dependence on
α is of the form Θs ∼ α
(γ−2)/(3−γ), i.e., there exists a non-vanishing cooperation level Θs no matter how small the
value of α. However, if the network is more homogeneous (e.g., γ > 3), Θs becomes unstable and for α → 0 the
system always falls in the fully defective Nash equilibria. Another important characterization of such system comes
from considering eq. (42) and eq. (43): We have ρk(t)→ 0 when k < c/(αΘs) and ρk(t)→ 1 for k > c/(αΘs). In this
sense, we find a qualitative agreement between the features of our equilibria and those found by Galeotti et al. [4], in
which players’ actions show a monotonic, non-decreasing dependence on their degrees.
VI. COMPARISON WITH NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
Before discussing and summarizing our results, one question that arises naturally is whether, given that mean field
approaches are approximations in so far as they assume interactions with a typical individual (or classes of typical
individuals), our results are accurate descriptions of the real dynamics of the system. Therefore, in this section we
present a brief comparison of the analytical results we obtained above with those arising from a complete program of
numerical simulations of the system recently carried out by us, whose details can be found in [42] (along with many
additional findings on issues that cannot be analytically studied). In this comparison, we focus on the scenario in
which mistakes are not allowed (ǫ = 0) as it, being deterministic, allows for a meaningful comparison of theory and
simulations without extra effects arising perhaps from poor sampling.
Concerning the best-shot game, numerical simulations fully confirm our analytical results. With PI, the dynamical
evolution is in perfect agreement with that predicted by both MF and HMF theory—which indeed coincide when
(as in our case) ρk(t = 0) does not depend on k. Simulations and analytics agree well also when the dynamics is
BR: The final state of the system is, for any initial condition, a Nash equilibrium with cooperators ratio ρs (which
decreases for increasing network connectivity). Yet, the ρs solution of ρ˙ = 0 from eq. (13) slightly underestimates the
one found in simulations—probably because of the approximation made in computing the probabilities Q of eq. (9).
Notwithstanding this minor quantitative disagreement, we can safely confirm the validity of our analytical results.
On the other hand, the agreement between theory and simulations is also good for coordination games with PI
dynamics. On homogeneous networks, numerical simulations show an abrupt transition from full defection to full
cooperation as α crosses a critical value value αT . The MF theory is thus able to qualitatively predict the behavior
of the system; furthermore, while αT is somewhat smaller than the αc predicted by the theory, simulations also show
that αT → αc in the infinite network size, which implies that for reasonably large systems our analytical predictions
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are accurately fulfilled. Finally, simulations cannot find other Nash equilibrium (with intermediate cooperation levels)
than full defection, again as predicted by the MF calculations. On heterogeneous networks instead, simulations show
a smooth crossover between full defection and full cooperation, and the point at which the transition starts (αT )
tends to zero as the system size grows. Therefore, the most important prediction of HMF theory, namely that the
fully defective state disappears in the large size limit (a phenomenon not captured by the simple MF approach), is
fully confirmed by simulations. Finally, concerning BR dynamics for coordination games, we have a similar scenario:
In homogeneous networks, simulations allow to find a sharp transition at αT from full defection to full cooperation,
featuring many non-trivial Nash equilibria (all characterized by intermediate cooperation levels) in the transient region.
This behavior, together with αT → αc in the infinite network size, agrees well with the approximate theoretical results.
Heterogeneous networks instead feature a continuous transition, and it appears from numerical simulations that—in
the infinite network size—a Nash equilibrium with non-vanishing cooperation level exists no matter how small the
value of α, exactly as predicted by the HMF calculations.
We can conclude that the set of analytical results we are presenting in this paper provides, in spite of its approximate
character, a very good description of the evolutionary equilibria of our two prototypical games, particularly so when
considering the more accurate HMF approach.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented two evolutionary approaches to two paradigmatic games on networks, namely the
best-shot game and the coordination game as representatives, respectively, of the wider classes of strategic substitutes
and complements. As we have seen, using the MF approximation we have been able to prove a number of rigorous
results, and otherwise to get good insights on the outcome of the evolution. Importantly, numerical simulations
support all our conclusions and confirm the validity of our analytical approach to the problem.
Proceeding in order of increasing cognitive demand, we first summarize what we have learned about PI dynamics,
equivalent to replicator dynamics in a well-mixed population. For the case of the best-shot game, this dynamics has
proven unable to refine the set of Nash equilibria, as it always leads to outcomes that are not Nash. On the other
hand, the asymptotic states obtained for the coordination game are Nash equilibria and constitute indeed a drastic
refinement, selecting a restricted set of values for the average cooperation. We believe that the difference between
these results arises from the fact that PI is an imitative dynamics and in a context such as the best-shot game, in
which equilibria are not symmetric, this leads to players imitating others who are playing “correctly” in their own
context but whose action is not appropriate for the imitator. In the coordination game, where the equilibria should be
symmetric, this is not a problem and we find equilibria characterized by an homogeneous action. Note that imitation
is quite difficult to justify for rational players (as humans are supposed to act), because it assumes bounded rationality
or lack of information leaving players no choice but copying others’ strategies [22]. Indeed, imitation is much more
apt to model contexts as biological evolution, where payoffs are interpreted as reproductive successes within natural
selection [43]. Under this interpretation, in the best-shot game for instance, it is clear that a cooperator surrounded
by defectors would die out, and be replaced by the offspring of one of its neighboring defectors.
When going to a more demanding evolutionary rule, BR does lead by construction to Nash equilibria—when players
are fully rational and do not make mistakes. We are then able to obtain predictions on the average level of cooperation
for the best-shot game but still many possible equilibria are compatible with that value. Predictions are less specific
for the coordination game, due to the fact that—in an intermediate range of initial conditions—different equilibria
with finite densities of cooperators are found. The general picture remains the same in terms of finding full defection
or full cooperation for low or high initial cooperation, but the intermediate region is much more difficult to study.
Besides, we have probed into the issue of degree heterogeneity by considering more complex network topologies.
Generally speaking, the results do not change much, at least qualitatively, for any of the dynamics applied to the
best-shot game. The coordination game is more difficult to deal with in this context but we were able to show that,
when the number of connections is very heterogeneous, cooperation may obtain even if the incentive for cooperation
vanishes. This vanishing of the transition point is reminiscent of what occurs for other processes on scale-free networks,
such as percolation of epidemic spreading [41]. Interestingly, our results are in contrast with [15], in the sense that—for
our dynamical approach—coordination games are more affected by the network (and are henceforth more difficult to
tackle) that anti-coordination ones.
Finally, a comment is in order about the generality of our results. We believe that the insight on how PI dynamics
drives the two types of games studied here should be applicable in general, i.e., PI should lead to dramatic reductions
of the set of equilibria for strategic complements, but is likely to be off and produce spurious results for strategic
substitutes, due to imitation of inappropriate choices of action. On the other hand, BR must produce Nash equilibria,
as already stated, leading to significant refinements for strategic substitutes but to only moderate ones for strategic
complements. This conclusion hints that different types of dynamics should be considered when refining the equilibria
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of the two types of games, and raises the question of whether a consistently better refinement could be found with only
one dynamics. In addition, our findings also hint to the possible little relevance of the particular network considered on
the ability of the dynamics to cut down the number of equilibria. In this respect, it is important to clarify that while
our results should apply to a wide class of networks going from homogeneous to extremely heterogeneous, networks
with correlations, clustering, or other nontrivial structural properties might behave differently. These are relevant
questions for network games that we hope will attract more research in the near future.
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